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ABSTRACT: In theory, flawed arguments are not individually sufficient to justify a conclusion, but several 
may converge to do so. This is an empirical study of how arguers respond to a series of imperfect causal 
arguments during a serious conversation. People became less critical of the flawed arguments as more of 
the arguments appeared. The study gives empirical evidence that ordinary arguers permit sufficiency to 
accumulate during an extended discussion. 
KEYWORDS: Causal argument, conductive argument, convergent argument, conversational argument, 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This investigation is concerned with arguments whose conclusion is supported (or at least 
pointed to) by several lines of argument. Our community vocabulary for this situation is 
somewhat variable. An important distinction is whether the individual lines of argument 
each bear directly on the single overall conclusion, or whether the lines of argument point 
to one another in some sort of sequence, so that only the last bit of argumentation is sup-
posed to produce the overall conclusion directly. I am concerned entirely with the first 
case, in which several conceptually independent reason sets each are pointed to the con-
clusion.   
2. CONVERGENT ARGUING 
Based on Henkemans’ (2000) discussion, I call this phenomenon convergent argumenta-
tion. Since it goes by other terms (e.g., van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs, 
1993, call it coordinately or subordinately compound argumentation) and is subsumed 
under (or contrasted with) other terms such as complex argumentation and conductive 
argument, I offer the following diagram for clarity (Fig. 1). The diagram illustrates a cen-
tral conclusion that is supported by three different arguments. Those arguments have no 
special relationship to one another, so that the strength of one has nothing to do with the 
strength of another. Each could be offered as the sole support for the main conclusion. 
The arguer’s strategy, of course, is that somehow the main conclusion will be more 
strongly implicated with three arguments than with one. 
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Fig. 1. A central conclusion that is supported by three different arguments 
As others have explored, this situation complicates our analysis of “the” argument.  If all 
three converging arguments are poor (i.e., have serious problems either with the illative 
issues of acceptability, relevance, and sufficiency, or with the dialectical tier; Johnson, 
2000) should we conclude that the main conclusion is poorly supported, or might we con-
sider the possibility that individually flawed reason sets might combine in some way to 
give more than poor support for the conclusion? Notice that this question is only interest-
ing if all the supporting reason sets are flawed. If one were a perfect deduction with ac-
ceptable premises and no dialectical vulnerability, the other reason sets would be irrele-
vant to the force of the conclusion. Is it possible, though, that several very refutable rea-
son sets might somehow combine to make a conclusion acceptable? 
 I will leave to others the normative and theoretical questions I have just men-
tioned. Here, my interest is in how ordinary arguers act in the face of multiple flawed 
reason sets bearing on one conclusion. Argumentation on complicated topics often con-
tains a number of attempts to justify a standpoint. People will try one bit of proof, then 
another, and this will play out naturally in the course of a serious conversation. Even 
when the individual lines of proof have observed and fundamental flaws, it may be that as 
the conversation progresses, participants begin to grant increasing plausibility to the gen-
eral conclusion, and cease to reject new (weak) supports with much energy; this is the 
central hypothesis of the study. 
3. METHOD 
72 undergraduates at the author’s institution participated in argumentative conversations 
on the topic of gun control. In every case, the other conversant was a confederate who 
had been trained to insert flawed causal arguments into the discussion. 11 confederates 
participated in the study. These circumstances were unknown to the participants until the 
debriefing.  The conversations were videotaped and lasted for about 5 minutes.   
 68% of respondents were women.  The sample’s mean age was 20.4 years (SD = 
3.2). 58% self-reported Euro-American ethnicity, 19% African-American, 7% Asian-
American, and the remainder were scattered among various nationalities or combinations 
of ethnicity. The sample’s mean self-reported high school grade point average was 3.6 on 
a four point scale (SD = .33) and their college grade point average was 3.3 (SD = .38).  
Main 
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Set 2 
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Respondents participated in order to earn minor extra credit in communication classes. 
The study was approved by the author’s Institutional Review Board. 
 Both conversants were directed to role play the part of a U.S. Senator. The pre-
tense for the conversation was that the two “Senators” had come together privately to 
work out some possible national legislation regulating handgun ownership in the U.S. 
Both were provided briefings by their fictional staffs. The briefing materials consisted of 
about 4 pages (single spaced) containing actual quotations taken from government docu-
ments, primarily testimony given at a 2005 U.S. House of Representatives committee 
hearing on gun control. The briefing materials indicated that the two Senators had oppos-
ing views, and all of the actual participants were assigned to the standpoint that ordinary 
citizens should not be allowed to own handguns. The conversations took place at a con-
ference table in our lab, and each Senator sat behind a nameplate (either Senator Jones or 
Senator Smith). Confederates were instructed to address the participant as “Senator” pe-
riodically. These steps were all taken in order to promote the seriousness of the conversa-
tion. The public business scenario, the semi-formality of the conversation, and perhaps 
most importantly, the provision of actual information to be used in the discussion, togeth-
er resulted in far more substantial arguments than when participants are just invited to 
argue about some topic on which they may be lightly informed. 
 Participants were given as much time as they wished to study the briefing mate-
rials. Many participants underlined or highlighted various portions of the briefing. They 
also responded to some demographic questions, and then went into the main part of the 
lab for the conversation, where they met the confederate. 
 The confederates’ briefing largely duplicated that of the participants, with the 
important exception that it concluded with a list of 10 weak causal arguments. These 
were paraphrases of testimony at the same U.S. House committee hearing. Confederates 
were instructed to insert as many of these arguments as possible into the conversation. 
Altogether, 306 instances of these arguments appeared in the 72 conversations.  
 The arguments are included here in the Appendix. They were constructed in 
such a way as to fail at least one of the critical questions tests in Walton, Reed, and 
Macagno’s (2008) analyses of cause to effect, abduction, or correlation to cause argument 
schemas. Among other flaws, these arguments mistake correlation for causality, try to 
justify a national policy on the basis of a single city’s experience, or project another 
country’s results onto the U.S. Readers can see for themselves that on a number of 
grounds, no one of the arguments in the Appendix is a decisive reason establishing the 
confederate’s standpoint, namely that handguns should be freely available to U.S. citi-
zens. All offer some sort of causal analysis of the relationship between handgun owner-
ship/restriction on crime. Confederates were trained not to press these arguments once the 
participant had declined to pursue them because we wanted the participants to be in con-
trol of when the line of argument terminated, how it was developed, or even whether it 
was explored at all.  
 The portions of the videotapes containing the confederates’ flawed arguments 
were identified and transcribed. Each transcribed segment began with the confederate’s 
presentation of the argument, and continued until that line of argument was complete. 
 The transcribed segments were then coded by the 11 confederates. The coding 
system was taken from Hample, Jones, and Averbeck (2009). The participant’s behaviors 
throughout each segment were classified into one of five categories: (1) accepted the ar-
DALE HAMPLE 
4 
gument; (2) ignored the argument; (3) rejected the argument without giving a reason; (4) 
rejected the argument with explicit refutation; and (5) took up the argument and revised it 
to make it sounder. The highest appropriate code for a given segment was recorded.  
 The codes are in order of sophistication. Given that the arguments were all 
known to be flawed, the least sophisticated response was to accept it. Ignoring it – most 
commonly by changing the topic – gives no real information about what the participant 
thought, but is intermediate between acceptance and refutation. Rejecting the argument 
with an objection or counter-argument shows more argumentative ability than just reject-
ing it out of hand. And finally, while rare here, revising the confederate’s argument to 
make it stronger (perhaps prior to refutation) is most advanced of all.  
 Reliability of the coding was assessed by regarding the system as interval and 
each coder as an independent indicator of the true score. Thus the coders became “items” 
in the usual Cronbach’s alpha analysis of a multi-item instrument. Cronbach’s alpha for 
the 11 coders was .88. This is well above the usual minimum requirement of alpha = .70. 
4. RESULTS 
The overall mean code was 3.48 (SD = .74). The average response was thus midway be-
tween 3 (rejects without reason) and 4 (rejects with explicit refutation). In other words, 
respondents generally recognized that the confederates’ arguments were, in fact, flawed. 
Neither high school GPA (r = -.07, p = .57) nor college GPA (r = .08, p = .54) predicted 
the mean response. However, age did have a significant effect: r = -.33, p < .01), indicat-
ing that older students were more accepting of the weak arguments. Men (Mean = 3.63) 
and women (Mean = 3.51) did not differ significantly in the sophistication with which 
they responded to the flawed causal arguments (t = .71, df = 70, p = .48). 
 
Position N Mean SD 
 
1 72 3.55 .67 
 
2 70 3.57 .62 
 
3 66 3.51 .77 
 
4 53 3.50 .78 
 
5 33 3.08 .91 
 
6 10 3.44 .61 
 
7 1 3.45 - 
 
 
Table 1. Mean Responses to Flawed Arguments By Conversational Position 
The main question of interest is whether participants became more accepting of the ar-
guments as the conversations progressed. We kept track of which confederate argument 
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appeared first, second, and so forth. The largest number of these arguments in any con-
versation was 7. Table 1 shows the mean responses for each conversational position. As 
Table 1 shows, the overall mean response does not change very much through the first 
few arguments.  
 Critically for the prospect of testing this result, however, the number of conver-
sations having higher numbers of arguments declines as we move to higher numbers of 
arguments. To test whether or not mean responses differ, we must analyze the very same 
respondents. If we wanted to compare the responses to arguments 1, 2, and 3, therefore, 
we would need to restrict ourselves to the 66 respondents who experienced three or more 
such arguments.  
 The best balance between sample size and number of flawed arguments ap-
peared to be with five arguments (N = 33, 165 arguments). The means for these respond-
ents are in Table 2. Repeated measures analysis of variance was conducted. The spherici-
ty assumption was violated in the data set (Mauchley’s W = .245, 2(9, N = 33) = 42.82, p 
< .001), so the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied. This resulted in F = 3.295, df 
= 2.54, p < .05, partial eta
2
 = .09. Table 2 shows that as we proceed through a sequence of 
weak arguments, the general response becomes lower (i.e., more accepting), apart from a 
bump at argument position 4. Both a linear (F = 6.43, df = 1, p < .05) and a cubic effect 
(F = 18.67, df = 1, p < .001) were significant.  
 
Position N Mean SD 
 
1 33 3.60 .56 
 
2 33 3.46 .68 
 
3 33 3.31 .87 
 
4 33 3.58 .62 
 
5 33 3.08 .91 
 
 
Table 2. Mean Responses to Flawed Arguments by Conversational  
Position for Respondents Exposed to 5 or More Flawed Arguments 
A test for only four argument positions fails to show the same effect, as inspection of 
Tables 1 and 2 might suggest. For this data, the sphericity assumption is not violated, and 
F = .18, df = 3, p = .91. Sample size for this test was 53, and the means for the four argu-
ment positions were respectively 3.58, 3.53, 3.51, and 3.50.  
5. DISCUSSION 
This investigation shows that as conversations moved through a sequence of five flawed 
causal arguments, people became less critical of them. This was entirely sensible behav-
ior. Readers should notice that all of the arguments in the Appendix have some probative 
merit. In isolation, none is sufficient to justify the confederate’s standpoint. But unlike 
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extreme fallacies—e.g., an invalid categorical syllogism—these arguments are merely 
weak, not completely valueless. The arguments in the Appendix are all relevant to the 
main conclusion and all ought to have been judged as being formed from acceptable 
premises. The essential problem for the arguments considered individually was sufficien-
cy. In combination, they began to approach that criterion, at least insofar as our partici-
pants’ responsive behaviors can inform us. 
 Those responses changed mainly on the occasion of the fifth argument here, but 
there is little reason to suppose that the fifth position has any generalizable importance. 
Assuming that people’s behaviors are approximating rationality in some degree, the point 
in the conversation where resistance begins to soften ought to be influenced by the quali-
ty of the flawed arguments. If the arguments have barely any probative value at all, the 
transition should be later. If the arguments have relatively minor flaws, arguers might feel 
at an earlier point that sufficiency has been approached or achieved.  
 It may or may not be important that sufficiency was the issue here, rather than 
acceptability, relevance, or the availability of an external counterargument. Certainly if 
all the premises in a series of arguments are obviously and totally wrong, accumulation of 
such proofs should not move anyone closer to the other’s standpoint. But how many 
premises have acceptability values of zero? Some, of course, but acceptability problems 
seem more likely to be a matter of degree. Even low acceptability might permit some 
accumulation. A similar remark applies to relevance.  If relevance is legitimately zero (as 
might happen if a standpoint is badly misanalyzed) we should not expect any rational 
accumulation. But a series of somewhat relevant arguments might eventually soften the 
impulse to refute or resist. Problems on the dialectical tier might be similarly analyzed. 
Conclusive objections would make accumulation irrational, but truly conclusive objec-
tions might be more common in pedagogical illustrations than in serious conversation 
between intelligent arguers.  
 An important limitation of the present study is its sample size. Collecting, tran-
scribing, and coding conversational data is very effortful. Although the ecological validi-
ty of such a design is a good compensation, the fact remains that some of the statistical 
evaluations were underpowered. The key tests were based on a very modest sample size 
because so few of the conversations had more than five of the flawed arguments. A par-
ticular frustration is that it proved impossible to follow up on the age effect. Hamilton 
and Hample (in press) speculate that the first year of college is critical in acquiring argu-
ing ability because college is the first intensive exposure to sophisticated arguments being 
explored open-mindedly in classrooms. With only four freshmen in the sample, however, 
no reasonable statistical analysis was possible. It may prove necessary to follow up on the 
present findings with a non-conversational design using vignettes in order to acquire a 
healthier sample size. 
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APPENDIX: FLAWED CASUAL ARGUMENTS 
 In Washington DC as soon as handguns were banned, the homicide rate went 
way up. We need to go back to what we had before, when citizens could carry 
guns, and then the murder rate will go down. 
 New York lets citizens carry guns and Washington DC doesn’t. The murder rate 
in DC is about 6 times higher than the murder rate in New York. If we have New 
York’s handgun law, we will have less people being murdered in DC. 
 Every place in the country where you have lenient gun laws, you have the lowest 
crime rates. So we ought to have more lenient gun laws not stricter ones. 
 After Washington started its gun ban, the murder rate went up about a third 
when you compare the 5 years before to the 5 years after. After Chicago started 
its gun ban, the robbery rate went way up, too. Taking guns out of citizens’ 
hands stimulates violent crime. 
 If citizens have their own guns, they can use them in self defense. This happens 
a lot in places that let people own their own handguns, like in Georgia. Not only 
is it good to be able to defend yourself just on general principles, but it will low-
er the crime rate too. 
 Obviously guns are aggressive tools. There are two sides to a crime. If criminals 
have a lot of guns, there will be a lot of crime. But if potential victims have a lot 
of them, the criminals will be deterred and there will be less crime. 
 After Australia put its strict guns laws into effect in 1996 violent crime went up 
32% in the next 6 years. Weak gun laws make stronger criminals. 
 Chicago has a gun control law like Washington’s, and Chicago also has a top ten 
homicide rate. That’s two out of two cities. Wherever you see a gun control law 
you also see a high murder rate, and you just have to wonder if that’s because 
citizens can’t defend themselves. 
 Virginia and Maryland have weaker gun laws that Washington, but the crime 
rates in those states are much lower than in Washington. You really have to con-
clude that lenient gun laws discourage crime. 
 So many people in Washington and Chicago get murdered and robbed it’s pretty 
obvious that they can’t defend themselves. And the gun control laws in those cit-
ies are what prevent them from defending themselves. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The paper discusses a very interesting topic of acceptability of convergent arguments and 
uses a very important (but unfortunately quite rare in argumentation theory, AT) experi-
mental method of investigation. I must say I am very interested in this method, since I 
believe that such research areas as argumentation theory need to confront a theory with 
practice and as a result there is a need for a balance between reflection and experimental 
methods. AT cannot be only an armchair philosophy if it aims to be close to the natural 
discourse, if it wants to teach how to analyze real-life arguments. And there are a lot of 
ready theories that AT can use as a source and from which it can benefit – except of so-
cial science methods used in this paper, there are e.g. linguistic methods of corpus analy-
sis (there are two corpora of analyzed arguments available online – multilingual corpus, 
ArgDB (Reed 2006) and Polish corpus, ArgDB-pl (Budzynska 2011)) or models of social 
psychology (used broadly by O'Keefe, see e.g. (O'Keefe 2007); but also in (Budzynska 
2010) where Elaboration Likelihood Model is used to study persuasive arguments; or  
(Pasquier et al. 2006) where cognitive coherence theory is applied to build a computa-
tional model of argument in multi-agent systems). Yet, the practically-oriented approach 
is still under-represented in AT community. But that is enough for the ideology on meth-
odology for argumentation theory—let us come back to the subject of the paper.  
 I will be rather brief in commenting on the results of the experiment presented in 
the paper—the numbers of the results speak for themselves. Instead I will spend some 
time on suggesting possible variants of the experiment which might be useful for further 
investigations into the issue of acceptability of convergent arguments. 
2. SOME COMMENTS AND A CLARIFICATION REQUEST  
Although later it becomes clear that the author concentrates on the subjective acceptabil-
ity of convergent arguments, in the introduction (in the second paragraph) it seemed to 
me like there might be some confusion between objective and subjective levels of argu-
ment evaluation:  
If all three converging arguments are poor (i.e., have serious problems either with the illative 
issues of acceptability, relevance, and sufficiency, or with the dialectical tier; Johnson 2000) 
should we conclude that the main conclusion is poorly supported, or might we consider the 
possibility that individually flawed reason sets might combine in some way to give more than 
poor support for the conclusion? (Hample 2011)  
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Maybe it is just unfortunate formulation, therefore I think it is worth stressing in the 
commentary that statistical method can provide data referring only to how people actual-
ly evaluate arguments. An experiment cannot demonstrate whether three poor convergent 
arguments give either poor or more than poor support for the conclusion. It can only show 
us whether the hearers think that three poor convergent arguments give poor or more than 
poor support for the conclusion.  
 The other issue that raises doubts was the scale used for the measurements in the 
experiment: “The participant’s behaviors throughout each segment were classified into 
one of five categories: (1) accepted the argument; (2) ignored the argument; (3) rejected 
the argument without giving a reason; (4) rejected the argument with explicit refutation; 
and (5) took up the argument and revised it to make it sounder” (Hample 2011). I agree 
that the last response is cognitively the most sophisticated one (which, as far as I under-
stood, was the criterion according to which this scale was built). However, I have some 
doubts about the adequacy of using the last category for the hypothesis tested in the ex-
periment. If the experiment was about to demonstrate whether people become less critical 
to the general conclusion (at the scale “less” means from the highest number, i.e. 5, to the 
lowest, i.e. 1), then (5) does not seem to me to be more critical than (4), i.e., rejecting the 
argument with explicit refutation. This response is in fact quite favourable with respect to 
the claim in this sense that the opponent concedes the claim, and only improves the ar-
gument which seemed weak to him. 
 Although I appreciate experimental method, it has some weakness. It can show 
whether a hypothesis is right or wrong, but it does not provide an explanation for the re-
sults obtained—the unintuitive results are left unexplained. For example, the experiment 
described in the paper showed that: “older students were more accepting of the weak ar-
guments”. That seems quite unintuitive. It would be very interesting to find out what is 
the possible reason for this phenomenon. The author suggests some possible explanation, 
however, with the data obtain it is impossible to verify it. Similarly, the experiment 
“shows that as we proceed through a sequence of weak arguments, the general response 
becomes lower (i.e., more accepting), apart from a bump at argument position 4” (Ham-
ple 2011). I wonder if the author has any hypothesis for this result. Maybe not every 
weak convergent argument has the same effect on the hearers. If this is the case, then the 
interesting question would be: what are the differences between convergent arguments 
which are important for their evaluation. 
 In the section “Discussion”, the author says that “This investigation shows that 
as conversations moved through a sequence of five flawed causal arguments, people be-
came less critical of them” (Hample 2011). This suggests that there is some kind of rela-
tion between the acceptance of subsequent convergent arguments. If this relation does not 
have the inferential character, then it would be interesting to examine issues like: what is 
the nature of this relation, whether the previous argument makes the hearer less critical 
about the premise of the next argument or about the conclusion (making him at some 
point more and more indifferent on what premises of next arguments state).  
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3. VARIANTS OF THE EXPERIMENT  
In this section, I discuss some possible variants of the experiment described in the paper, 
which might be useful for the future investigation into the relation between the number of 
convergent arguments and their acceptability. 
3.1 Processing convergent arguments in central vs. peripheral route  
It would be interesting to explore what are the differences in the evaluation of convergent 
arguments when the hearer processes them in the central and peripheral route (Petty and 
Cacioppo 1986). The number of arguments serves as a peripheral cue which the hearer 
uses to evaluate whether he should believe the message. The experiment in (Petty and 
Cacioppo 1984) showed that when the peripheral route is activated the more weak 
arguments are given the more favourable thoughts the hearer has, while when the central 
route is activated the more weak arguments are given the less favourable thoughts the 
hearer has. This does not hold for strong arguments. Both in central and peripheral routes, 
the more strong arguments, the more favourable attitude towards the message. It would 
be interesting to see is there any differences between the dynamics of acceptability when 
the subsequent arguments are all convergent causal arguments and when they are of other 
type of convergent arguments or when they are deductive and so on. It could be also 
examined whether the convergent causal arguments behave differently than the arguments 
considered in the experiment in (Petty and Cacioppo 1984)—maybe e.g. the critical 
attitude decreases quicker when the arguments are convergent? 
3.2 Weak vs. fallacious convergent arguments  
In the paper, both weak (but not completely valueless) and fallacious arguments were 
used in the experiment. It would be interesting to design an experiment where only weak 
convergent arguments would be given and the other one when only fallacious convergent 
arguments would be proposed. In the peripheral route, the hypothesis is that the type of 
the flaw should not matter, since the receivers do not consider the content of the message. 
In the central route, the hypothesis would be that the fallacies would decrease 
acceptability faster than weak but not fallacious arguments.  
3.3 Independent vs. inconsistent arguments  
It would also be interesting to examine whether the dynamics of acceptability of 
convergent arguments is different depending on the relation between the contents of 
subsequent convergent arguments, like e.g.: (1) when they are completely independent 
(referring to unrelated data); (2) when their contents somehow overlap, e.g. showing the 
same data (such as “legalization of guns reduced crime...”) with small variations (such as 
“...reduced in New York”,  “...reduced in Chicago” and so on); (3) when the contents are 
somehow inconsistent with each other, e.g. “legalization of guns reduced crime in most 
big cities in US, therefore we should make it legal in DC”, “US has one of the highest 
rates of crime in the world, including DC, therefore we should make guns legal in DC”.  
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3.4 Undercutter vs. rebuttal counter-arguments as a critical response 
It might also be interesting to extend the scale: (1) accepted the argument; (2) ignored the 
argument; (3) rejected the argument without giving a reason; (4) rejected the argument 
with explicit refutation, with the differentiation for various types of counter-arguments 
such as undercutter and rebuttal. It seems like undercutting response would be more 
sophisticated critique and therefore could be viewed as more critical than the rebutting one. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The paper shows the results of the (important for argumentation theory) experimental 
method applied to investigations into interesting topic of the acceptability of convergent 
arguments. It also opens several exciting paths for further exploration of the deep and 
complicated nature of how people evaluate this type of arguments.  
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